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Abstract—This paper considers a scenario in which an access
point (AP) is equipped with a mobile edge server of finite
computing power, and serves multiple resource-hungry mobile
users by charging users a price. Pricing provides users with
incentives in offloading. However, existing works on pricing are
based on abstract concave utility functions (e.g, the logarithm
function), giving no dependence on physical layer parameters.
To that end, we first introduce a novel utility function, which
measures the cost reduction by offloading as compared with
executing jobs locally. Based on this utility function we then
formulate two offloading games, with one maximizing individual’s
interest and the other maximizing the overall system’s interest.
We analyze the structural property of the games and admit in
closed form the Nash Equilibrium and the Social Equilibrium,
respectively. The proposed expressions are functions of the user
parameters such as the weights of computational time and energy,
the distance from the AP, thus constituting an advancement
over prior economic works that have considered only abstract
functions. Finally, we propose an optimal pricing-based scheme,
with which we prove that the interactive decision-making process
with self-interested users converges to a Nash Equilibrium point
equal to the Social Equilibrium point.
Index Terms—Mobile edge computing, multi-user offloading,
game theory, wireless network economics
I. INTRODUCTION
With the development of internet services, a diverse variety
of computing-intensive applications such as mobile shopping,
face recognition, and augmented reality, are emerging and
attracting great attention. The execution of those novel applica-
tions typically requires low latency and high power consump-
tion [1]. Meanwhile, due to its physical size constraint, the
mobile device usually has insufficient local computing power
or limited battery capacities. As such, it may not provide
satisfactory quality of experience to the users. An alternative
way is to offload all or part of the jobs to the resource-rich
cloud infrastructures such as Amazon EC2 via the access point
(AP) associated with users. Such cloud-aided computing eases
users’ burden in executing computing-intensive jobs in time.
However, it also suffers from wide area network (WAN) delay
between the cloud and the AP, as the cloud is often located
far away from the users [2].
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More recently, a new trend of moving the function of cloud
computing to the network edge is happening. Along this line
and in the cellular network, the network edge refers to the
radio access network (RAN) side of the Internet, and the
AP (e.g., the base station, the Wi-Fi) is equipped with one
additional computing server, i.e., the mobile edge computing
(MEC) server. There are two dominant advantages of applying
MEC technology in cellular networks. First, instead of residing
in a far-away cloud, the computing server is located at the
AP, close to the mobile device users, thus avoiding the
WAN delay between the AP and the cloud. Second, since
the AP is in control of both the computing and the radio
resource, a joint optimization of those resources could be
performed, bringing about considerable improvement in the
computing/radio resource efficiency.
Presently, researchers have been actively studying the joint
optimization of computing and radio resources for different
MEC based scenarios. Specifically, the works of [3]–[6]
consider the single user case, jointly deciding the offloading
decision, the CPU-cycle frequencies for mobile execution,
and the transmit power for offloading. The works of [7]–[10]
further examine the multi-user case, with users offloading jobs
to the AP in a spatial division multiple access (SDMA), a
time division multiple access (TMDA) or a frequency division
multiple access (FDMA) mode. The case with multiple access
points is studied in [11], wherein a mobile user allocates its
jobs to multiple nearby access points. The D2D case is studied
in [12], wherein mobile users can dynamically and beneficially
share the computation and communication resources among
each other. More complex energy harvesting driven networks
are considered in [13], [14], where energy-constrained mobiles
are considered and the energy harvesting technique is inte-
grated into the mobile edge computing cellular networks. The
above studies all formulate a centralized resource allocation
problem, which involves solving a Mixed Integer Nonlinear
Programming (MINP) problem, and most of them only give
numerical results to illustrate the performance.
Due to the nature of sharing an MEC server, the expected
delays of different users spent in the system required by
the edge computing are coupled. Hence, it is usually very
complicated to optimize the MINP problem centrally. More-
over, since users are strategic, making decisions to maximize
individual welfare, it is not easy to control the decision
variable directly. Therefore, another line of research targets
resource allocation in a distributed way. In particular, the
works of [15]–[19] reformulate the original centralized MINP
problem into an interactive decision-making process among a
2group of rational users. Based on game theory the equilibrium
points of the interactive decision process are examined, and
decentralized algorithms with low complexity are proposed.
In [20], the original problem is decomposed into several easy-
to-handle sub-problems and solved semi-distributively with
convex optimization techniques.
A. Related works and main contributions of this paper
In this paper, we aim to do resource allocation in a de-
centralized way. Different from [15]–[20], we take queueing
delays into account. Specifically, we consider an MEC assisted
RAN serving multiple mobile device users as in [20], except
that, unlike [20] which only considers a binary decision of
offloading, we consider a more general case of controlling
the flow rate of offloading. Our network comprises users that
work in a FDMA mode to offload part/all of its jobs to the
AP. Users may have different attributes, such as distance from
the AP, battery capacity, and the application it runs. As such,
different users have different utilities of offloading. In addition,
since the computing power of the edge is limited, the users
offloading jobs are competing for computing resource, and
congestion may happen if too many jobs are offloaded to
the edge. Therefore, waste would be reduced if the limited
computing resources at the AP are reserved for the users that
value them the most.
Pricing is a key tool to allocate resources to the users who
value them the most, thus controlling congestion in resource
competition cases [21], [22]. In addition, in economics there
are some mechanisms such as the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves
(VCG) mechanism, which is designed to provide incentives to
the users to choose the socially optimal levels of demand and
reveal their true utility functions; this mechanism is especially
useful when the allocation requires users’ payoff functions and
users may have motivations to cheat. However, existing works
from the economics viewpoint such as [23], [24] are based on
abstract utility functions (e.g., a simple logarithm function of
the amount of product) and give no specific dependence of the
utility function on the physical layer parameters. In this paper,
we study the interactive decision-making process among users
to optimize the physical layer parameters. Unlike the works
of [15]–[19], which only study the Nash Equilibrium and no
incentive-aware scheme is considered, in this paper we aim to
integrate the ideas of economics into the optimization of MEC
networks. Our goal is to provide users with the appropriate
incentives to control their flows and improve the overall system
performance in a distributed way. Our main contributions are
summarized below.
1) We introduce a novel utility function (see eq. (13)),
which subtracting the delay cost required by edge com-
puting equals the profit a user achieves by offload-
ing (14). This utility function measures the difference
between the local computing cost and the offloading
cost (including the offloading delay and the offloading
energy consumption). We prove that the proposed utility
function is concave and monotonously increasing with
respect to users’ offloading flow rate, satisfying the
basic nature of the utility function in economics, thus
bridging the gap between the economics and physical
layer parameter optimizations.
2) Based on the given utility function we propose an
incentive-aware job offloading framework, in which the
user decides the amount to offload by comparing its
utility function with the delay cost required by edge
computing. We determine in closed form the Nash
Equilibrium point (see Theorem 1) as well as the Social
Equilibrium point (see Theorem 3). Our analytical results
fully describe the dependence of the Equilibria on the
edge computing power as well as the user parameters
such as the local computing power, the weights of the
computational time and energy the distance from the AP,
and apply to any number of users.
3) We derive in closed form the sufficient and necessary
conditions for a positive unique Nash/Social Equilibrium
to exist (see Corollary 1 and Corollary 2, respectively).
We also propose an optimal pricing-based scheme (see
Table Algorithm 1), which regulates users’ action by
adding an appropriate price. With this pricing-based
scheme, the individual objectives of self-interested users
are aligned with that of the overall system, and the
interactive decision-making process with self-interested
users converges to a Nash Equilibrium point equal to
the Social Equilibrium point (see Theorem 4).
B. Organization of this paper
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section
II, we introduce the system model, including the computation
model, the radio access model and the offloading policy. In
Section III, we propose a business model for mobile edge
computing, based on which we formulate two games, with one
maximizing individual’s interest and the other maximizing the
overall system interest. In Section IV, we examine the equi-
librium points of the games, based on which we propose an
optimal pricing-based scheme. We prove that with this pricing-
based scheme, the individual objectives of self-interested users
are aligned with that of the overall system. Numerical results
are given in Section V and conclusions are drawn in Section
VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider an MEC system (see Fig. 1(a)) consisting
of an AP and multiple mobile devices. The wireless AP
could be a small-cell base station, or a Wi-Fi AP. Aside
from serving as a conventional AP to the core network, it
is installed with an additional computing server and serves
as an edge computing server. The mobile devices are running
computation-intensive and delay-sensitive jobs, however, they
may have insufficient computing power or limited battery
energy to complete those jobs. As such, the devices that are
short of computing or energy resources, should offload part of
their jobs to the AP. In what follows, we will introduce the
offloading policy, the wireless channel model, followed by the
models for computing.
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Fig. 1: (a) A multi-user mobile-edge computing system. (b) An
illustration of the job arrival/offloading/computation model.
A. The offloading policy and the radio access model
Before proceeding to the offloading policy, we first intro-
duce the job generation model. We assume that jobs arrive
at the mobile device user following a Poisson process and at
a rate of λa. On the other hand, in wireless communication
systems time is divided into slots having a unit duration of
t0 = 1 ms. As such, we have a discrete-version of the Poisson
arrival process, i.e., a Bernoulli process with the parameter
pa = λat0 [25]. The inter-arrival times at the mobile device
are thus independent and i.i.d. random variables, following
a geometric distribution with the parameter pa. Besides, the
service times are assumed to be identically distributed (i.i.d.)
and exponentially distributed with parameter µa. In this paper,
the job offloading is described by a tuple (la, µa), where µa
represents the average CPU cycles required to accomplish a
job, and the product laµa (e.g., the input parameters and the
program codes) denotes the required offloading data size per
job.
The mobile device users that are short of computing or
energy resources, intend to offload all/part of their jobs to the
AP. Specifically, when a job arrives, the mobile device will
check its wireless channel condition to the AP. We consider
flat-fading channels and assume that the channel coherence
time is bigger than the time required to finish offloading a job.
As such, we assume that once a decision to offload its current
job is made, the mobile device user could finish offloading in
a channel block. Hence, we consider the following offloading
policy. When a job arrives and the channel is too bad to
carry data transmission, the mobile device user shall choose
local computing, instead of waiting for a favorable channel
condition. On the other hand, if the channel power gain is
higher than a threshold to support its expected transmission
rate, denoted by βk, the mobile device user would choose to
offload its job to the AP.
In this paper, we consider the scenario with sufficient
wireless frequency bands, and multiple mobile devices access
to the AP in a FDMA mode. This is possible in the future
TABLE I: Summary of key notations
Notation Description
t0 The time duration per time slot
pa Job arrival probability at the mobile device per time slot
λa Job arrival rate at the mobile device (jobs per second)
µa Average CPU cycles needed by the computation job
la The input data size per cycle (in nat)
κm The energy coefficient of the mobile device
xk User k’s offloading frequency
dk User k’s distance to the access point
Pt User k’s transmit power
σ2 Received noise power at the access point
ce
k
User k’s weight of the computational energy
ct
k
User k’s weight of the computational time
hk User k’s instantaneous small-scale channel gain
βk User k’s transmission rate
fm CPU-cycle frequency of the mobile device
µm Computing service rate of User k (jobs per second)
fB CPU-cycle frequency of the MEC server
µB Computing service rate of the MEC server (jobs per second)
gk User k’s demand function
N The number of mobile device users
five-generation (5G) wireless communication era, wherein an
unprecedented spectrum and multi-Gigabit-per-second (Gbps)
data rates are available to its users. In FDMA mode, each
mobile device user is allocated a different frequency band,
indicating that they suffer no multi-user interference from each
other. Let hk denote the small-scale channel gain from the k-
th mobile device to the AP, k = 1, 2, · · · , N . The achievable
uplink data rate can thus be computed by
Rk = log(1 + d
−α
k |hk|
2Pt/σ
2), k = 1, 2, · · · , N, (1)
where dk denotes user k-th distance to the AP and α represents
the path loss exponent. Pt is the transmission power and σ
2
denotes the received noise power at the AP. Comparing the
achievable data rate Rk with the expected data rate βk and by
Shannon theorem [26], one can see that when Rk > βk the
mobile device could offload its job to the AP successfully. By
some mathematical derivations and letting ρk = d
−α
k Pt/σ
2
be the received SNR, we arrive at the following conditions of
successful offloading,
|hk|
2 > (eβk − 1)ρ−1k , k = 1, 2, · · · , N. (2)
These, combined with the aforementioned offloading policy,
indicate that the offloading frequencies (probabilities) are
xk = Pr(|hk|
2 > (eβk − 1)ρ−1k ), k = 1, 2, · · · , N. (3)
According to the expressions in (3), it can be seen that the
offloading frequency at the mobile device user is a decreasing
function of the threshold value of βk. As such, by adjusting
βk the mobile device user is able to control the frequency it
offloads jobs.
B. Computation model
According to the offloading policy, jobs that are offloaded
to the AP will be pushed into a buffer of the AP, awaiting
for edge computing. Otherwise, the jobs are pushed into a
local buffer, awaiting for local computing. In what follows,
4we discuss the total overhead/cost in terms of local computing
and edge computing.
1) Local computing: In the local computing approach the
mobile device user executes the job with its own computing
power. Let fm be the mobile device’s computing capability
(CPU cycles per second), which indicates that the service rate
of local computing as µmt0 = (fm/µa)t0 (jobs per slot).
Thus, for each job the expected time spent in the system
(including both the computation execution time and the time
awaiting in a local buffer) can be given as
DLCk (xk) =
1
µmt0 − pa(1− xk)
t0
(a)
=
1
µm − λa(1− xk)
, k = 1, 2, · · · , N, (4)
where (a) is due to pa = λat0. The computational energy spent
in local computing can be expressed as
ELCk = κmf
2
mµa, k = 1, 2, · · · , N, (5)
where κmf
2
m is the power consumption per CPU cycle, and
κm is an energy consumption coefficient that depends on the
chip architecture [27].
Combining (4) and (5) we can compute the total weighted
cost by local computing as follows,
ZLCk (xk) = c
e
kE
LC
k + c
t
kD
LC
k (xk), k = 1, 2, · · · , N, (6)
where 0 < cek < 1 (in units 1/Joule) and 0 < c
t
k < 1 (in units
1/Second) are the weights of the computational energy and
time. With different weights cek and c
t
k we allow different users
to put different emphasis in decision making. For example,
when the mobile device is at a low battery state, it would
tend to reduce the energy consumption in decision making.
As such, the user will choose a higher value of cek. On the
other hand, when the user has a more stringent quality of
experience (QoE) requirement in delay, it would like to put
more consideration to the delay cost and it will set a bigger
value of ctk.
2) Edge computing: In the edge computing approach the
mobile device user will offload its job to the AP and resort
to the computing power of the AP. First, it takes the mobile
device some time to complete offloading, which can be calcu-
lated as follows,
DECk,1(xk) =
laµa
βk(xk)
, k = 1, 2, · · · , N. (7)
This, combined with the the fact each mobile device transmits
with power Pt, indicates that the energy required by offloading
is
EECk (xk) = Pt
laµa
βk(xk)
, k = 1, 2, · · · , N. (8)
On the other hand, it takes some time for the offloaded job
to stay at the AP before it leaves after execution. Based on
the aforementioned offloading policy, the mobile device will
choose to offload its jobs with probability xk. This, combined
with the splitting property of the queueing theory [25], indi-
cates that the job offloading from a mobile device user also
follows a Poisson process, with parameter λaxk. Therefore,
the job arrival at the AP is a superposition of multiple Poisson
processes from multiple mobile devices, which, according to
the superposition property of queueing theory [25], is another
Poisson process with the arrival rate as the sum arrival rate
of the superposed processes, i.e.,
∑N
k=1 λaxk. In addition,
the service times are i.i.d. and exponentially distributed with
parameter µa. Therefore, we get a M/M/1 queue for computing
at the AP. Let fB be the AP’s computing capability (CPU
cycles per second). The service rate of the mobile device is
then µB = fB/µa (jobs per second). Hence, for each job the
expected time spent at the AP (including both the computation
execution time and the time spent awaiting in the edge buffer)
can be expressed as,
DECk,2(x) =
1
µB −
∑N
k=1 λaxk
, ∀k, (9)
where x , (x1, x2, · · · , xN ).
Similar to many existing studies such as [13], [16], [18],
we neglect the energy overhead of edge computing, due to the
fact that normally the AP can access to wired charing and it
has no lack-of-energy issues. As such, by combining (7) to (9)
we could compute the total weighted cost by edge computing
as follows,
ZECk (x) = c
e
kE
EC
k (xk) + c
t
k(D
EC
k,1 (xk) +D
EC
k,2(x)),
k = 1, · · · , N. (10)
Note that the total cost by offloading as well as the end-to-
end delay of computation DECk,2(x) depend on both the local
variable (i.e., xk for the k-th user) and also the offloading
frequency of other users. As we will see later, due to this
coupled nature of delay we have coupled objective functions.
III. GAME FORMULATION
Due to the sharing nature of MEC server, the delay and
hence the cost of offloading for users are coupled. As such,
it is usually difficult to jointly optimize users’ offloading
decisions centrally. On the other hand, the mobile devices are
owned by different individuals who may have different QoE
requirements on delay and pursue different interests. In that
case, the economics theory is a useful tool in dealing with
interactions among users, devising decentralized mechanisms
with low complexity, and inducing users to self-organize into
a mutually satisfactory solution.
In the following, we will formulate games from the per-
spective of economics. Towards that goal, we first introduce
a business model for mobile edge computing, which includes
physical layer parameters in the utility function and the cost
function. Then, based on the proposed business model we
formulate two games, with one maximizing the individual’s
interest and the other maximizing the overall system’s interest.
A. Proposed economics model for mobile edge computing
By the aforementioned offloading policy, upon the arrival
of a new job, the mobile device will choose to offload
with probability xk, or push it into a local buffer for local
5computing with probability x¯k (x¯k , 1− xk). Therefore, the
expected total cost can be written as follows,
Zk(x) = x¯kZ
LC
k (xk) + xkZ
EC
k (x). (11)
On the other hand, when there is no such edge server
providing computing power, users have to complete every job
by themselves and the average cost running a job locally is
ZLCk (0). This, combined with (11), indicates that the gross
profit of offloading by the k-th user under a given offloading
strategy x is,
Vk(x) = Z
LC
k (0)− Zk(x), k = 1, · · · , N. (12)
The key idea of the business model is to introduce the
utility function and the cost function. Several observations are
in order. Firstly, the profit each user obtains equals the cost
savings from offloading, and it is a linear combination of the
energy costs and the delay costs. Secondly, the coupled delay
cost DECk,2(x) reflects the harm/congestion each user causes to
the other users, with a bigger value indicating that the AP
provides worse service to the users. Thirdly, except for the
expected time spent at the AP, i.e., DECk,2 (x), which depends
on all users’ offloading decisions, the other items in the profit
function only depend on each user’s own offloading frequency
xk. Motivated by these observations, we introduce a utility
function Uk(xk) which includes the items in the profit function
that only depend on the local variable xk, i.e.,
Uk(xk) =Z
LC
k (0)− x¯kZ
LC
k (xk)
− xk(c
e
kE
EC
k (xk) + c
t
kD
EC
k,1(xk)). (13)
This, combined with (12), indicates that
Vk(x) = Uk(xk)− Ck(x), k = 1, · · · , N, (14)
where Ck(x) , c
t
kxkD
EC
k,2(x) can be regarded as the cost due
to the sharing of an MEC server at the AP.
In economics, the utility function measures the welfare a
consumer obtains, as a function of the consumption of real
goods such as food, clothes, and so on. Here, we apply a utility
function to capture the benefit a user can obtain by offloading.
The offloading frequency xk quantifies the amount a user is
willing to offload; a higher offloading frequency indicates that
the user is more willing to offload. By comparing the utility
function and the cost function in (14), each user could find
its indifferent point of offloading frequency, i.e., the point at
which the user achieves a maximum profit. It turns out that the
utility function in (13) is strictly concave and strictly increases
with respect to users’ offloading frequency, satisfying the law
of diminishing marginal returns in economics; this is discussed
in the following lemmas.
Lemma 1: Taking the derivative of Uk(xk) with respect to
xk, we arrive at the demand function of user k, i.e.,
gk(xk) ,
∂Uk(xk)
∂xk
.
For each mobile device user, it holds true that the demand
function gk(xk) is a monotonically decreasing function of
the offloading frequency xk. Moreover, there exists a unique
solution of the equation gk(xk) = 0, denoted as x
up
k .
Proof: See Appendix A
Lemma 1 indicates that the utility function is a concave
function of the offloading frequency xk .
Lemma 2: For each mobile device user, it holds true that
Uk(0) = 0, and the utility function Uk(xk) is a monotonically
increasing function of the offloading frequency xk ∈ [0, x
up
k ].
Proof: By the definition of Uk(xk), it is easy to verify
that Uk(0) = 0. On the other hand, according to Lemma 1,
it is clear that gk(x
up
k ) = 0. In addition, since gk(xk) is a
monotonically decreasing function of xk, it holds true that
gk(xk) > 0 when xk < x
up
k . This completes the proof.
Lemma 3: If the i-th mobile device user is closer to the AP
than the j-th user, that is, di < dj , then its utility function
strictly dominates that of the j-th user, i.e., Ui(x) > Uj(x).
Proof: The proof is omitted since it could be easily
verified with the formula of Uk(xk) in (13).
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tances.
Lemma 1 to 3 provide the properties of the utility curve.
That curve is illustrated in Fig. 2 (as a function of the
offloading frequency), for a system with ctk = 0.9, c
e
k = 0.1,
fm = 0.1GHz. The job arrives at a rate of λa = 0.6 jobs per
second, with each job requiring an average of µa = 100M
CPU-cycles to run and an average of laµa = 100 nats
to offload. Different distances, i.e., d = 10m, d = 50m
and d = 70m, from the user to the AP are respectively
considered. One can see that the utility function is strictly
increasing but the increasing rate (i.e., the demand function
of g(xk)) decreases as the offloading frequency increases; this
is consistent with the law of diminishing marginal returns in
economics, i.e., the more the user consumes, the demand for
additional unit of goods decreases. Moreover, the user closer
to the AP has a greater demand to offload and can achieve a
higher utility value with the same offloading amount. This is
keeping with the intuition that the closer the user is to the AP,
the better the wireless channel it experiences.
B. Game formulations
We first consider a decentralized computation offloading
decision making problem, wherein for any given strategies of
others, the mobile device user intends to maximize its own
6profit Vk(x) by optimizing the local offloading frequency xk
via adjusting its threshold parameter βk. Specifically, we have
the following optimization problem that each mobile device
user needs to solve for.
Problem 1 (Selfish Problem):
x⋆k ,argmax
xk
Vk(x)
s.t. 0 ≤ xk ≤ 1. (15)
Definition 1: A strategy profile x⋆ = (x⋆1, · · · , x
⋆
N ) is a Nash
Equilibrium (NE) of the offloading game if at the equilibrium
x
⋆, no player can further increase its profit by unilaterally
changing its strategy, which indicates that
Vk(x
⋆
k,x
⋆
−k) ≥ Vk(xk,x
⋆
−k), ∀xk, k = 1, · · · , N. (16)
where x⋆−k , (x
⋆
1, · · · , x
⋆
k−1, x
⋆
k+1, · · · , x
⋆
N ).
With Problem 1, we formulate a game in which each mobile
device user is selfish and responses to maximize its own
benefit. The objective of this game is to find the NE point
from which no mobile device user has incentives to deviate.
However, the solution of Problem 1 is locally optimal; it may
not coverage to a point where the sum profit of all the users
is maximized.
On the other hand, we consider a social-welfare computation
offloading decision making problem. Assume that the AP acts
as a social planner, usually referred to as the hand of God
in economics. It would like users to choose their offloading
decisions such that the sum profit
∑N
k=1 Vk(x) is maximized.
Specifically, we have the following optimization problem that
each mobile device user needs to solve for.
Problem 2 (Social Problem):
x¯⋆k ,argmax
xk
∑N
k=1
Vk(x)
s.t. 0 ≤ xk ≤ 1. (17)
Definition 2: A strategy profile x¯⋆ = (x¯⋆1, · · · , x¯
⋆
N ) is
a Social Equilibrium (SE) of the offloading game if at the
equilibrium x¯⋆, no player can further increase the sum profit
of the whole system (social welfare) by unilaterally changing
its strategy, which indicates that∑N
k=1
Vk(x¯
⋆
k, x¯
⋆
−k) ≥
∑N
k=1
Vk(xk, x¯
⋆
−k), ∀xk. (18)
where x¯⋆−k , (x¯
⋆
1, · · · , x¯
⋆
k−1, x¯
⋆
k+1, · · · , x¯
⋆
N ).
Intuitively, in Problem 2 each user should also be concerned
with the congestion it causes to other users and should keep
its offloading under an appropriate amount for other users’
welfare; the difficulty lies in how to incentivise users to do
so when users are selfish and will choose their offloading
decisions such that its individual profit Vk(xk) is maximized.
Pricing is a useful tool in incentivising users to choose the
socially optimal levels of demand. The key idea is to enforce
users to pay for the congestion it causes to the other users. In
the following Problem 3, we study the pricing-based scheme,
which charges users an additional edge computing service fee
to regulate users’ behavior.
Problem 3 (Regulated Selfish Problem):
xˆ⋆k ,argmax
xk
Vk(x)− Pxk
s.t. 0 ≤ xk ≤ 1, (19)
where P denotes the unit price for offloading. In the following
section, our goal is to derive an optimal price of P such
that the interactive decision-making process with regulated
self-interested users converges to a Nash Equilibrium point
equal to the Social Equilibrium point. It is worth noting that
in a practical system the optimal pricing could be learned
based on the historical supply-demand relationship. Due to
limitations of space, in this paper we only give discussions on
the existence of such optimal price and show the advantages
it brings in terms of the overall system performance.
IV. OPTIMAL SOLUTIONS OF OFFLOADING
In this section, we aim to derive an optimal price to regulate
users’ behavior, such that by this pricing-based scheme the
individual objectives of self-interested users are aligned with
that of the overall system. Towards that goal, we first analyze
the structural property of the games and admit in closed form
the Nash Equilibrium and the Social Equilibrium, respectively.
Based on these results, we then propose the optimal price.
Under this pricing-based scheme, the interactive decision-
making process with self-interested users converges to a Nash
Equilibrium point equal to the Social Equilibrium point. In
this way, we provide an algorithm which improves the overall
resource efficiency and enhances the system performance in a
distributed way.
For the purpose of getting more insights into the offloading
problem, we first investigate the case in which users have the
same time cost weight as well as the same energy cost weight,
i.e., ctk = c
t
0, c
e
k = c
e
0, ∀k.
A. Analysis of Nash Equilibrium
The key idea for deriving the equilibrium is to look into the
necessary conditions, i.e., at the equilibrium the derivative of
the objective function should be zero.
We first look into Problem 1. At the equilibrium it holds
that
∂Uk(xk)
∂xk
−
∂xkc
t
kD
EC
k,2 (x)
∂xk
= 0
⇔gk(xk) =
ct0(µB −
∑N
j 6=k λaxj)
(µB −
∑N
j=1 λaxj)
2
, k = 1, · · · , N. (20)
Combing those N equations in (20) yields the following
Theorem.
Theorem 1: For the case with users of the same demand
function, denoted by gk = g0, ∀k (also referred to as
the homogeneous user case in the following), at the Nash
Equilibrium each mobile device user has the same value of
offloading frequency x⋆0, which can be achieved via setting
a same parameter of β⋆k . Moreover, the offloading frequency
satisfies the following equation,
Nλax
⋆
0 +
√
ct0(µB − (N − 1)λax
⋆
0)
g0(x⋆0)
= µB. (21)
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Corollary 1: For homogeneous user case, if the following
equation is satisfied,
ce0E
LC
k +
ct0µm
(µm − λa)2
>
ct0
µB
, (22)
there exists a positive unique Nash Equilibrium. Otherwise,
no mobile device would like to offload, which corresponds to
a trivial Nash Equilibrium, i.e., x⋆k = 0, ∀k.
Proof: See Appendix C
B. Analysis of Social Equilibrium
In Problem 2 the users should also take into account the
negative effects of congestions it causes to the other users. As
such, at the equilibrium it holds that
∂Uk(xk)
∂xk
−
∑N
j=1
∂ct0xjD
EC
j,2 (x)
∂xk
= 0
⇔gk(xk) =
ct0µB
(µB −
∑N
j=1 λaxj)
2
, k = 1, · · · , N,
⇔µB −
∑N
j=1
λaxj =
√
ct0µB
gk(xk)
, k = 1, · · · , N. (23)
The equations in (23) give the necessary conditions of the
social equilibrium by Problem 2. Based on (23) we discuss the
existence as well as the uniqueness of the Social Equilibrium,
which is summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 2: There exists a unique Social Equilibrium point,
at which the sum profit of users is maximized and no user
can further increase the sum profit by unilaterally changing
its strategy.
Proof: See Appendix D
Furthermore, for the homogeneous user case, the Social
Equilibrium point can be derived in closed-form, which is
summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 3: For the homogeneous user case, at the Social
Equilibrium each mobile device user has the same value of
offloading frequency x¯⋆0, which can be obtained via setting
a same parameter of β¯⋆k . Moreover, the offloading frequency
satisfies the following equation,
Nλax¯
⋆
0 +
√
ct0µB
g0(x¯⋆0)
= µB. (24)
Proof: For any given offloading frequency vector x =
(x1, · · · , xN ) satisfying (23), it holds that g0(xm) = g0(xn),
∀m,n. Moreover, according to Lemma 1, g0(x) is a monoton-
ically decreasing function of x. Therefore, xm = xn = x¯
⋆
0,
∀m,n. Substituting this into (23) yields (24). This completes
the proof.
Corollary 2: For the homogeneous user case, if the following
inequality is satisfied,
ce0E
LC
k +
ct0µm
(µm − λa)2
>
ct0
µB
,
there exists a positive unique Social Equilibrium. Otherwise,
no mobile device would like to offload, which corresponds to
a trivial Social Equilibrium, i.e., x¯⋆k = 0, ∀k.
Proof: The proof is omitted since it is similar to that of
Corollary 1.
Corollary 3: Comparing the Nash Equilibrium and the
Social Equilibrium, the former converges to a Equilibrium
point with a higher offloading frequency, i.e.,
x⋆0 > x¯
⋆
0.
Proof: Clearly, it holds that ct0(µB − (N − 1)λax
⋆
0) <
ct0µB , which, combined with (21) and (24), indicates that
g0(x
⋆
0) < g0(x¯
⋆
0). Besides, according to Lemma 1, g0(x) is a
monotonically deceasing function. As such, we have x⋆0 > x¯
⋆
0.
This completes the proof.
Corollary 3 is consistent with the intuition that less jobs will
be offloaded by the users who aim to solve for Problem 2,
since they put additional consideration on the harm offloading
causes to the other mobile device users.
C. Optimal pricing-based scheme to achieve Social Equilib-
rium
According to Corollary 3, less jobs will be offloaded by
users for the purpose of maximizing the sum profit of users.
However, in the market every user is selfish and aims to
maximize its own benefit.
In this subsection we study the regulated selfish problem,
which regulates users’ action via charging them appropriate
economic expenses for providing the edge computing service.
The goal is to align the individual objectives of self-interested
users with that of the overall system, such that the interactive
decision-making process with self-interested users converges
to a Nash Equilibrium point equal to the Social Equilibrium
point.
Recall Problem 3 where each mobile device user is selfish
and aims to maximize its own benefit. The user is required to
pay for offloading at a unit price of P . As such, we replace
Vk(xk) in Problem 1 with Vˆk(xk) = Vk(xk) − Pxk. Taking
the derivative of Vˆk(xk) with respect to xk and letting it be
zero, we arrive at similar formulas as in (20), i.e.,
gk(xk)− P =
ct0(µB −
∑N
j 6=k λaxj)
(µB −
∑N
j=1 λaxj)
2
, k = 1, · · · , N. (25)
Letting gˆk(xk) = gk(xk)− P and by some algebra deriva-
tions of the equations in (25), we obtain
µB −
N∑
j 6=k
λaxj = FN (xk), k = 1, · · · , N, (26)
where FN (xk) , λaxk+
ct0
2gˆk(xk)
+
√
(
ct0
2gˆk(xk)
)2 +
ct0λaxk
gˆk(xk)
.
The equations in (26) give the necessary conditions of the
equilibrium of the game, indicating the best response of a user
when the other users’ offloading decisions are given. Based on
(26) we update the offloading frequency xk iteratively. The
iteration stops until the offloading frequency difference of two
8Algorithm 1 Pricing-based social-optimal algorithm
1: Initialization: x0k = 0, ∀k
2: t← 0
3: while δx > ǫ do ⊲ We have the answer if δx ≤ ǫ
4: for k = 1, · · · , N do
5: b← µB −
∑k−1
j=1 λax
t+1
j −
∑N
j=k+1 λax
t
j
6: xt+1k ← Solve FN (x
t+1
k ) = b for x
t+1
k
7: end
8: δx ←
1
N
∑N
k=1 |x
t+1
k − x
t
k|
9: t← t+ 1
10: end
11: return βk(xk), ∀k ⊲ According to (3)
neighbor iterations almost equals zero, which indicates that
we arrive at the NE point. We summarize this decentralized
pricing-based algorithm as in Table Algorithm 1. Combing
Theorem 2 and Theorem 4 indicates that for the homogeneous
user case we arrive at a NE equal to the unique SE. In
addition, as we will show later in the numerical results part, for
the heterogeneous user case this decentralized pricing-based
algorithm also converges.
It is worth noting that in a practical system and for the
purpose of determining the best response, instead of all the
other users’ offloading decisions, a user only needs to get to
know the left hand side of Eq. (26) which could be learned
from its historical delays of edge computing. From this point,
an online user-behavior learning problem for the evolutional
offloading strategy is attracting, which is one of the our
extension works in the near future.
By far, we have finished deriving a framework for deter-
mining the offloading strategy. What remains is to determine
the optimal price such that the proposed distributed algorithm
converges to a Nash Equilibrium equal to the Social Equilib-
rium. On comparing the equations in (23) and (25), for the
purpose of obtaining a Nash Equilibrium equal to the Social
Equilibrium, we should set the price as follows,
P =
ct0(
∑N
j 6=k λax¯
⋆
j )
(µB −
∑N
j=1 λax¯
⋆
j )
2
≈
ct0(
∑N
j=1 λax¯
⋆
j )
(µB −
∑N
j=1 λax¯
⋆
j )
2
, (27)
where the approximation is due to the intuition of applying
a uniform pricing since users are setting the same weights
of computational energy of ct0. It should be expected that the
approximation in (27) is good when there are a large number
of users.
Meanwhile, we consider the special homogeneous user case,
in which the optimal price could be derived in closed-form.
Specifically, substituting (25) into Theorem 1 and comparing
the result with Theorem 3, we arrive at Theorem 4 as follows.
Theorem 4: Considering the homogeneous user case, for
the Nash Equilibrium point to equal to the Social Equilibrium
point, the price should be set as
P =
(N − 1)λa
µB
x¯⋆0g0(x¯
⋆
0).
Proof: See Appendix E
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we conduct simulations to validate our
theoretical findings and the proposed algorithm (see Algorithm
1) for both the homogeneous and the heterogeneous user
cases. We consider a system model as illustrated in Fig.
1. For simplicity, we consider the symmetric case where
ctk = c
t
0 = 0.9, c
e
k = c
e
0 = 0.1, ∀k. The computing power
at the AP and the mobile device users are fB = 3GHz and
fm = 0.1GHz, respectively [27]. The job arrives at the mobile
device user at a rate of λa = 0.6, with each job requiring an
average of µa = 100M CPU-cycles to run and laµa = 100
nats of input data size to offload.
The channels are modeled as multipath flat fading. The
effect of the channel between any transmit-receive pair on
the transmitted signal is modeled by a multiplicative scalar
of the form d−αhk [28], where d is the distance between the
two terminals, α = 3.5 is the path loss exponent. The small-
scale channel gains are assumed to be identically distributed
(i.i.d.) and exponentially distributed with parameter 1, i.e.,
|hk|
2 ∼ exp(1). Substituting this distribution into (3) yields
xk = exp(−(e
βk − 1)ρ−1k ), k = 1, 2, · · · , N.
The transmit power is P = 100mW and the noise power
level is σ2 = −40dBm. Unless otherwise specified, we set
d = 50m. As such, the received SNR at the AP is ρk =
d−αk Pt/σ
2 = 0.89. The stop threshold ǫ = 10−3.
A. The special homogeneous user case
In this subsection, we consider the homogeneous scenario
in which users are uniformly distributed on a circle of radius
R = d (unit: meters) and the AP locates at the center; in this
case, all the users have the same utility functions.
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Fig. 3: Convergence of the proposed algorithm in the homo-
geneous user case.
Fig. 3 illustrates the convergence of the proposed algorithm.
The scheme with the price P = 0 and the proposed scheme
(see Table Algorithm 1) with the optimal price (see Theorem 4)
are considered respectively. The local information of FN (xk)
and the edge delay-related information µB −
∑N
j 6=k λaxj
are assumed to be known at the end user in the interactive
decision-making process. In a practical system the latter
could be learned from the historical information on its edge
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Fig. 5: Profit Ratio SE/NE in the homogeneous user case.
computing delays. In the simulations we assume that such
information could be perfectly estimated at the end users. It
can be seen that the scheme with price equal to zero converges
to the NE point given by Theorem 1. In contrast, the scheme
with the optimal price converges to the SE point, where the
SE point is given by Theorem 3. This accomplishes the goal
that, via charging expenses for the edge computing service the
interactive decision-making process with self-interested users
converges to a Nash Equilibrium point equal to the Social
Equilibrium point. In this way, users’ behavior is regulated
effectively and the edge computing resources go to the users
who value them the most. Moreover, as compared with the
latter scheme which needs around one hundred iterations to
converge, one can see that the pricing-based scheme con-
verges very fast, i.e., with only several iterations. The fast
convergence property of the proposed pricing-based scheme is
especially useful when facing an online user-behavior learning
problem.
Fig. 4 illustrates the profit each user obtains by offloading
a job to the edge. As expected, at the SE point a greater profit
is achieved, and this improvement increases as the user moves
closer to the AP. This is because the congestion becomes more
secious as the offloading increases, while pricing helps to
combat that. For the purpose of easy comparison, in Fig. 5
we further plot the ratio of the profit performance that we can
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get at the SE point and at the NE point, which indicates how
the network performance benefits when applying the optimal
pricing-based scheme. It can be seen that the ratio of SE/NE
increases as the number of mobile device users connected
to the AP increases. For the case of 200 users and with
the proposed optimal pricing-based scheme, each user almost
achieves a double profit as compared with applying the scheme
charging no fees for the mobile edge computing service.
In Fig. 6 we plot the offloading frequency at the NE point
and also at the SE point. It can be seen that more jobs will
be offloaded when an user moves closer to the AP, since it
experiences a smaller path loss and a better wireless channel.
On the other hand, less jobs will be offloaded at the SE point
as compared with that at the NE point. This is because, in the
social-welfare game each user should pay for the congestion it
causes to the other users. This suggests that by charging some
appropriate edge computing service fee, users’ behaviors can
be regulated effectively.
In Fig. 7 we check the average delays of local computing as
well as edge computing. It can be seen that, the average delay
of local computing increases a little bit even if it takes into
account the congestion it causes to the other users. In contrast,
the average delay of edge computing for the proposed pricing-
based scheme decreases a lot. As such, at the SE point the user
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enjoys a smaller average delay. In addition, this improvement
increases as the number of mobile device users increases. This
should be expected, since in the social-welfare game the user
offloads fewer jobs to the edge, which reduces the burden
of the edge in computing especially when there are a large
number of users.
B. The general heterogeneous user case
In the previous discussions, we have provided numerical
results for the special case in which all the users have
the same utility functions. In this subsection, we consider
the heterogeneous user case where users are located at a
random different distance to the AP. Specifically, we place
mobile device users uniformly at random on a ring of radius
10 ≤ d ≤ 75 (unit: meters) and center located at the AP; in
this case and according to Fig. 2, one can see that the users
have different utility functions. As such, it is difficult to derive
closed-form results of the equilibrium as in the aforementioned
homogeneous user case.
In Fig. 8 we compare the convergence of the pricing-based
scheme and that of the optimal Social Equilibrium. The Social
Equilibrium given by Theorem 3 for the homogeneous user
case can not be applied here since each user may have a
different utility function. Instead, by some algebra derivations
of (23), we arrive at
µB −
N∑
j 6=k
λaxj = FS(xk), k = 1, · · · , N, (28)
where FS(xk) , λaxk +
√
ct0µB/gk(xk). The equations in
(28) give the necessary conditions of the equilibrium of the
game, indicating the best response of a user when the other
users’ offloading decisions are given. Based on (28) we update
the offloading frequency xk one after another and iteratively;
by Definition 2, if there exists an equilibrium point of this
iteration, that equilibrium should be the Social Equilibrium.
From Fig. 8, it can be seen that this iterative process converges
after around a hundred of rounds. On the other hand, the
optimal price given by Theorem 4 also cannot be applied here.
Instead, in the simulations we use the price of (27), where the
offloading frequency of x¯⋆k is given by the social problem.
It can be seen that the interactive decision-making process
converges to the same point as that by the social problem.
Fig. 8 plots the mean offloading frequency of users. In Fig.
9 we further respectively plot the profit each user obtains and
its offloading frequency at the equilibrium. Interestingly, it can
be seen that by the proposed pricing-based scheme and at
the equilibrium, each user obtains the same profit as that at
the Social Equilibrium. According to Theorem 2, that Social
Equilibrium should be unique. Hence, the proposed pricing-
based scheme is global optimal, under which the interactive
decision-making process among users converges to a NE point
equal to the SE point. In addition, as expected, the user closer
to the AP offloads more frequently.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed an incentive-based of-
floading control framework for the mobile edge computing
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network, which consists of a radio access network (RAN)
that is equipped with a mobile edge server (MEC) of finite
computing power, and serves multiple resource-hungry mobile
device users by charging users appropriate economic expenses
for offloading computation jobs to the edge. Firstly, we have
introduced a novel physical layer rooted utility function, which
measures the reduction in cost by offloading as compared to
executing jobs locally. We have proved this utility function
satisfies some basic economic properties, thus bridging the gap
between physical layer optimizations and economics. With this
proposed utility function we then formulate two computation
offloading decision making games, with one maximizing the
individual’s interest and the other maximizing the overall
system’s welfare. We have addressed analytically the structural
property of the games and admit in closed form the Nash
Equilibrium and the Social Equilibrium, respectively, based
on which we then proposed an optimal pricing scheme, which
regulates users’ action by charging expenses for providing
the edge computing service. Numerical results support our
theoretical results that under our proposed optimal pricing-
based scheme, the interactive decision-making process with
self-interested users converges to a Nash Equilibrium point
equal to the Social Equilibrium point.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF Lemma 1
By definition, the demand function is equal to the derivative
of the utility function with respect to the offloading frequency
xk, which, combined with (13) indicates that
gk(xk) = c
e
kE
LC
k −
η
βk(xk)
+
ηβ′k(xk)xk
β2k(xk)
+
ctkµm
(µm − λax¯k)2
(29)
where η , (ctk + c
e
kPt)laµa.
Looking into the expressions in (29), the second term
−
η
βk(xk)
as well as the last term
ctkµm
(µm − λax¯k)2
decreases
as xk increases, since βk(xk) is a decreasing function with
respect to xk (see (3)). In addition, it holds that −xβ
′(x) > 0.
And in the sequel, we will further show that −xkβ
′
k(xk)
increases as xk increases, thus giving the proof that gk(xk)
decreases as xk increases.
Letting ψ(x) = −xβ′(x) and by the derivative of ψ(x), we
arrive at
ψ′(x) = lim
∆x→0
ψ(x+∆x) − ψ(x)
∆x
= lim
∆x→0
−
(x+∆x)β′(x +∆x)− xβ′(x)
∆x
. (30)
Besides this, by the definition of derivative it holds that
β′(x) = lim
∆x→0
β(x+∆x) − β(x)
∆x
, (31a)
β′(x+∆x) = lim
∆x→0
β(x+∆x−∆x) − β(x+∆x)
−∆x
.
(31b)
Combining (31a) and (31b) yields
(x+∆x)β′(x+∆x)− xβ′(x) = β(x +∆x)− β(x).
This, combined with (30), indicates that
ψ′(x) = −β′(x).
Since βk(xk) is a decreasing function with respect to xk, it
holds true that ψ′(x) > 0. Hence, −xβ′(x) is a monotonically
increasing function with respect to x. This completes the proof
of the first part of Lemma 1.
According to the above argument, it shows that gk(xk) is
a monotonically decreasing function with respect to xk. In
addition, it can be verified that
lim
xk→0+
gk(xk) = c
e
kE
LC
k +
ctkµm
(µm − λa)2
> 0,
lim
xk→1−
gk(xk) = −∞.
Therefore, the solution of the equation gk(xk) = 0 exists and
it is unique. This completes the proof.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF Theorem 1
By definition, at the equilibrium the derivative of the objec-
tive function should be zero. Hence, according to (20) and at
the equilibrium it holds that
(µB −
∑N
j=1
λaxj)
2 =
ct0(µB −
∑N
j 6=k λaxj)
g0(xk)
, ∀k. (32)
In what follows, we prove by contradiction and show that
for any given offloading frequency vector x = (x1, · · · , xN )
satisfying (32), xm = xn holds true for ∀m,n. Substituting
this result into (32), we arrive at the result of (21) in Theorem
1.
Assume that there exists a pair of (xm, xn), with xm > xn.
By Lemma 1, g0(xk) is a monotonically decreasing function.
As such, it holds that g0(xm) < g0(xn). Besides, it holds
that µB −
∑N
j 6=m λaxj > µB −
∑N
j 6=n λaxj , since (µB −∑N
j=1 λaxj)+λaxm > (µB−
∑N
j=1 λaxj)+λaxn. Therefore,
we have
ct0(µB −
∑N
j 6=m λaxj)
g0(xm)
>
ct0(µB −
∑N
j 6=n λaxj)
g0(xn)
.
This contradicts with (32). Similarly, we can prove that the
assumption xm < xn also contradicts with (32). In summary,
it holds that xm = xn, ∀m,n. This completes the proof.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF Corollary 1
For the ease of exposition, let the left side of Eq. (21) denote
by
φ(xk) = Nλaxk +
√
ct0(µB − (N − 1)λaxk)
g0(xk)
.
It can be verified that φ(xk) is a monotonically increasing
function with respect to xk. In addition, we will show later
that there exists some xk such that φ(xk) is greater than the
right hand side of Eq. (21), i.e., µB . As such, as long as there
exists some xk such that φ(xk) is less than µB , we can infer
that there exists a unique solution to Eq. (21).
Specifically, it can be verified that
lim
xk→x
up
k
φ(xk) = +∞ > µB, lim
xk→0
φ(xk) =
√
ct0µB
g0(0)
.
Therefore, we arrive at a sufficient condition for the existence
of solutions to Eq. (21) as follows,√
ct0µB
g0(0)
< µB ⇔
ct0
µB
< g0(0) = c
e
0E
LC
k +
ct0µm
(µm − λa)2
.
And, that solution should be unique due to the monotonicity of
φ(xk) with respect to xk. This completes the proof that if (22)
holds true, there exists a positive unique Nash Equilibrium.
In the sequel, we prove that if g0(0) ≤ c
t
0/µB , the profit
function Vk(x) is a non-increasing function with respect to
xk. In that case, the best response for the mobile device user
is to stop offloading and compute all the jobs locally.
12
Some observations are in order. Firstly, it can be verified
that
ct0(µB −
∑N
j 6=k λaxj)
(µB −
∑N
j=1 λaxj)
2
≥
ct0
(µB −
∑N
j=1 λaxj)
≥
ct0
µB
.
Secondly, by assumption it holds that g0(0) ≤
ct0
µB
. Combining
the above observations yields
ct0(µB −
∑N
j 6=k λaxj)
(µB −
∑N
j=1 λaxj)
2
≥ g0(0) ≥ g0(xk).
This, combined with (14)(20), indicates that the derivative of
the profit function Vk(x) is no more than zero. This completes
the proof.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF Theorem 2
As discussed in Sec. IV. B, the equations in (23) give the
necessary conditions of the equilibrium of the game. Hence,
for the purpose of studying the existence and the uniqueness
of the Social Equilibrium point, it is sufficient to investigate
the solution of the equations in (23).
The combination of the N equations in (23) indicates that
at the equilibrium there exists some positive value of t such
that gk(xk) = t, ∀k. As such, the equations in (23) can be
reformulated as follows,
µB −
∑N
j=1
λaxj =
√
ct0µB
t
, (33a)
gk(xk) = t, ∀k. (33b)
In the sequel, we will first prove the existence of the solu-
tions of (33a)(33b), followed by the proof of its uniqueness.
In this way, we give the proof of Theorem 2
There exists at least a solution to the equations in
(33a)(33b): Some observations are in order.
1) Firstly, the nontrivial case where users cannot benefit
from offloading is out of the scope of this paper. As
such, only if a user’s demand at xk = 0 is greater than
the edge computing cost, will it choose to offload its job
to the edge i.e., it holds true that
gk(0) >
ct0
µB
⇔ µB >
√
ct0µB
gk(0)
.
Therefore, at the offloading vector of x = 0 it holds that
µB −
∑N
j=1
λaxj >
√
ct0µB
t
. (34)
2) Secondly, it holds that limt→0+
√
ct0µB
t
= +∞. As
such, there exists some offloading vector of x so as to
µB −
∑N
j=1
λaxj <
√
ct0µB
t
. (35)
3) Thirdly, the left hand side of Eq. (33a) is monotonically
decreasing while the right hand side is monotonically
increasing.
Combining the above observations, we conclude that there
exists at least a solution to the equations in (33a)(33b).
The solution of the equations in (33a)(33b) is unique:
We give the proof by contradiction. Assume that there ex-
ist two equilibrium points x1 = (x11, · · · , x
1
N ) and x
2 =
(x21, · · · , x
2
N ), at which it satisfies that t1 = gk(x
1
k), ∀k,
t2 = gk(x
2
k), ∀k, and t1 6= t2. Without loss of general-
ity, let’s consider the case of t1 > t2. As such, we have
gk(x
1
k) > gk(x
2
k), ∀k. In addition, by Lemma 1 the demand
function gk(xk) is a monotonically decreasing function of the
offloading frequency xk. Therefore, it holds that x
1
k < x
2
k, ∀k,
which further indicates that
µB −
∑N
j=1
λax
1
j > µB −
∑N
j=1
λax
2
j ,
⇔
√
ct0µB
t1
>
√
ct0µB
t2
⇔ t1 < t2. (36)
The inequality in (36) contradicts with the assumption of t1 >
t2. This completes the proof.
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF Theorem 4
Substituting (25) into Theorem 1 indicates that at the Nash
Equilibrium it holds that
Nλaxˆ
⋆
0 +
√
ct0(µB − (N − 1)λaxˆ
⋆
0)
g0(xˆ⋆0)− P
= µB. (37)
For the purpose of having a Nash Equilibrium point equal to
the Social Equilibrium point, we should have xˆ⋆0 = x¯
⋆
0. As
such, the solution xˆ⋆0 should also satisfy Eq. (24). Combining
Eq. (37) and Eq. (24) yields
ct0(µB − (N − 1)λax¯
⋆
0)
g0(x¯⋆0)− P
=
ct0µB
g0(x¯⋆0)
⇔P =
(N − 1)λax¯
⋆
0
µB
g0(x¯
⋆
0).
This completes the proof.
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